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It is relatively common for tort claims to be resolved through settlements
under which compensation to the injured plaintiff is paid out over time in
installments, rather than in a single lump sum.' Such settlements are generally
termed "structured settlements"2 and, for a variety of reasons, can be advantageous
to both the plaintiff and the defendant.3
It has become an increasingly widespread practice in recent years, however,
for plaintiffs who enter into structured settlements to later attempt to assign some
or all of their deferred payment rights to a finance company in exchange for a
lump sum.4 In effect, those plaintiffs seek to undo the deferred payment feature
of their settlements, and often such plaintiffs are willing to do this at a rate that is
substant-ially discounted from the face value of the payment rights.5 A number of
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1. Marcus L. Plant, Ruminations on Tort Law: A Symposium in Honor of Max Malone: Periodic
Payment of Damages for Personal Injury, 44 LA. L. REV. 1327, 1327 (1984).
2. See, e.g., Allan G. King, Ph.D., The Economics of Structured Settlements, 45 TEX. B.J. 301
(1982); T.V. Mangelsdorf, Structured Settlements in Review: The Fundamental Concept, 4 AM. J. TRIAL
ADvoc. 559 (1981); Jay M. Zitter, J.D., Annotation, Propriety and Effect of "Structured Settlements "
Whereby Damages are Paid in Installments Over a Period of Time, and Attorneys' Fees Arrangements
in Relation Thereto, 31 A.L.R.4th 95 (1984); Ralph R. Frasca & Thomas J. Brady, Structuring
Settlements: Who Wins?, TRIAL, Aug. 1982, at 40; James C. Moore, Structured Settlements:
Considerations for Defense Counsel, 17 FORUM 1335 (1982).
3. Structured settlements can provide tax advantages to both the plaintiff and the defendant, as well
as sparing the defendant the need to come up with an immediate large lump sum payment and providing
some protection for the plaintiff against dissipation of the award. For an extensive discussion of the
characteristics of structured settlements and of their tax ramifications, see generally Leo Andrada,
Structured Settlements: The Assignability Problem, 9 S. CAL. INTERDIsc. L. J. 465 (2000).
4. Philip H. Corboy, Structuredfora Reason, A.B.A. J., June 2000, at 116 (stating that "a new breed
of aggressive hucksters known as factoring companies have recently begun buying settlement payments"
in return for a lesser lump sum); Julie Gannon Shoop, Selling Structured Settlements: Boon or
Boondogglefor Injury Victims?, TRIAL, July 1999, at 12 (stating that the "emerging 'settlement purchase'
industry, barely heard of even a few years ago" is providing clients with the option of trading back a stream
of periodic settlement payments for a lump sum).
5. "The industry [of firms willing to buy structured settlement payment rights] acknowledges discount
rates as high as twenty-eight percent, while courts and government officials report discounts as high as
seventy-two percent." Corboy, supra note4, at 116; see also Shoop, supra note 4, at 13 (discussing typical
"factoring companies" 6 have come forward to accommodate this desire.7 This
development gave rise to some opposition calling for limitations on such
assignments. This opposition is based in part upon paternalistic concern for the
long-term welfare of structured settlement recipients,' but is also encountered by
perceived threats to the insurance industry's current five-billion-dollars-a-year
business of selling annuities to tort defendants for the purpose of paying structured
settlements.9 These concerns have led to legislative enactments in a number of
states that impose purchaser disclosure obligations and prior judicial consent
limitations on these assignments.'0 They have also led to as-yet-unsuccessful
federal efforts to sharply restrict such assignments through the imposition of large
tax penalties on factoring companies."
discount rates ranging from eighteen to twenty-one percent).
6. Corboy, supra note 4, at 12 (defining "factoring companies" as those that buy structured settlement
payments in return for a lump sum).
7. The leading company in this industry, J.G. Wentworth & Co., accounts for about seventy-five
percent ofstructured settlement purchases. Vanessa O'Connell, Like it or Lump it: Thriving Industry Buys
Insurance Settlements From Injured Plaintiffs, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 1998, at Al (stating that J.G.
Wentworth "dominates the industry"); see also Shoop, supra note 4, at 12 (stating that J.G. Wentworth &
Co. is the "industry leader"). As of March 1999, J.G. Wentworth & Co. had completed over 15,000
structured settlement purchase transactions with a total value of over $370 million and broadcasted over
90,000 television commercials since March of 1997 seeking to encourage structured settlement recipients
to enter into such transactions. See Margaret Mannix, Settling for Less: Should Accident Victims Sell
Their Monthly Payouts?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 25, 1999, at 63.
8. See Corboy, supra note 4; Shoop, supra note 4, at 12.
9. O'Connell, supra note 7, at Al (stating that "insurers sell $5 billion a year of long term savings
contracts or annuities to defendants in personal injury cases for the purpose of paying structured
settlements").
10. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE §§ 10134 to 10141 (West 2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-225f
(West 2000); GA CODE ANN. § § 51-12-70 to 73, 51-12-7 to 77 (Michie 1982); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
454.430 to 431, 435 (Banks-Baldwin 2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A §§ 2241, 2243, 2245-46
(West 2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 549.30 to 549.33 (West 2000); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 407.1060,.1 062,
.1064,.1066, .1068 (West 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-394.1, 1-543.10 to. 15 (West 2000); VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 59.1-475 to .477 (Michie 1999); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46A-6H-l to 8 (Michie 2000).
11. On July 23, 1998, Representatives Clay Shaw (R-Fla.) and Pete Stark (D-Calif.) introduced H.R.
4314 which proposed the imposition upon factoring companies of a fifty percent excise tax on the difference
between the total face value of the annuity payments purchased from a settlement recipient and the lump-
sum payment made to that recipient, with some court-approved hardship exceptions from this tax penalty.
144 CONG. REc. H6281 (July 23, 1998), at H6281. That bill followed an earlier U.S. Treasury
Department request that the imposition of a twenty percent excise tax on such transactions be included in
the FY 1999 budget. Meg Fletcher, Bill Targets Settlement Buyers: Companies Offering Lump Sums to
Victims Would Face New Tax, Bus. INS., Aug. 3, 1998, at 2. On October 2, 1998, Senators John Chafee
(R-R.I.), Max Baucus (D-Mont.), Charles Grassley (R-Iowa), Carol Moseley-Braun (D-ll.), John D.
Rockefeller IV (D-W.Va.), and John Kerrey (D-Neb.) jointly introduced S. 2543, which proposed similar
restrictions to those contained in H.R. 4314. 144 CONG. REC. S 11339 (Oct. 2, 1998), at S 11340-341; see
also Structured Settlement Protection Act, S.R. 2543, 105th Cong. (1998).
It must be emphasized that both the House and Senate 1998 bills called for the imposition of the fifty
percent excise tax on the gross difference between the face value of the annuity payments and the lump sum
payment made, rather than on the net profits to the factoring company of the assignment transaction, which
are usually much smaller. This excise tax will, in most instances, exceed the net profits to the factoring
company from the transaction, and clearly seems intended to altogether eliminate such assignments except
where the hardship exception criteria are met. Neither bill, however, was enacted into law during the 1998
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Even apart from such statutes, however, this growing practice of assigning
structured settlement payment rights raises difficult legal questions. The
structured settlement agreements and subsequent annuity contracts entered into by
plaintiffs, defendants, and insurance companies, involved in funding and
overseeing the payment arrangements, 2 almost always contain provisions
prohibiting the plaintiff from assigning his right to receive the payments to a third
party. 3 The issue of the effectiveness of such assignments in the face of an
explicit anti-assignment clause is currently being litigated in a number of
jurisdictions, with little consistency in outcomes or rationales. 4 This Article will
session of Congress.
In 1999, the Treasury Department again called for an excise tax on such transactions as part of the
Administration's proposed FY 2000 budget. On February 10, 1999, Representatives Shaw and Stark
reintroduced their prior bill as H.R. 263, and on May 13, 1999, Senators Chafee, Baucus, Grassley,
Rockefeller, John Breaux (D-La.), Kerrey, and Charles Robb (D-Va.), reintroduced their prior bill. 145
CONG. REC. S1045 (daily ed. May 13, 1999); 145 CONG. REC. S5283 (daily ed. May 13, 1999). Once
again, however, neither bill was enacted into law during the 1999 session of Congress.
12. While some structured settlement payment obligations are self-funded by institutional defendants,
in most instances the defendant's insurance company agrees to shoulder the defendant's payment obligations
in exchange for a payment by the defendant, and then uses a portion of this payment to purchase an annuity
contract from another company that specializes in such arrangements to fund the payment obligations.
13. Upon rare occasion, structured settlement agreements do not contain any explicit limitations upon
the payee's right to assign their payments. Under such circumstances, courts have generally permitted
assignments. See, e.g., W. United Life Assurance Co. v. Hayden, 64 F.3d 833, 838-43 (3d Cir. 1995);
Settlement Funding, LLC v. Jamestown Life Ins. Co., 78 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1365 (N.D. Ga. 1999). See
also In re Brooks, 248 B.R. 99, 105 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2000) (holding that assignment was ermissible
where some but not all of the relevant agreements contained anti-assignment provisions). This article will
focus entirely upon the much more common situation where the structured settlement agreement includes
an explicit anti-assignment provision.
14. The recent case law addressing this question is extensive. A fairly large proportion of the decisions
apply either Connecticut or Illinois law, but the question has arisen in a number of other jurisdictions as
well. See, e.g., W. United Life Assurance Co. v. Hayden, 64 F.3d 833,842-43 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that
assignment was valid); Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Boston v. Stone St. Capital, Inc., 93 F. Supp. 2d 630,
638 (D. Md. 2000) (holding that an assignment was void because the structured settlement's anti-
assignment provision was a valid and enforceable term); In re Brooks, 248 B.R. at 105 (holding that
assignment was permissible); In re Terry, 245 B.R. 422, 427-28 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2000) (holding that
assignment was valid so that payments are no longer part of the estate for bankruptcy); In re Cooper, 242
B.R. 767, 772 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1999) (same); In re Berghman, 235 B.R. 683, 693 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1999) (denying declaratory relieftoplaintiffseeking to transfer structured settlement benefits to third party);
Townsend v. Hartford Life Ins., No. 97-C-3232-W, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21783, at *4-5 (N.D. Ala. June
30, 1999) (holding that an anti-assignment provision of the settlement agreement between the parties was
clear and unambiguous in precluding plaintiff from assigning her benefits); Grieve v. Gen. Am. Life Ins.
Co., 58 F. Supp. 2d 319, 324 (D. Vt. 1999) (holding that anti-assignment provision was an unambiguous,
bargained-for term, and therefore enforceable); In re Freeman, 232 B.R. 497,503 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999)
(holding that assignment was valid so that payments are no longer part of the estate for bankruptcy);
Wonsey v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 32 F. Supp. 2d 939, 944 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (granting declaratory
judgment to allow assignment ofperiodic payments under structured settlement agreement); Johnson v. First
Colony Life Ins. Co., 26 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1230 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (holding that non assignability clause
review the recent case law in this area, attempt to identify the central issues that
are presented by those cases, and then offer suggestions on the proper resolution
of these issues.
II. DISCUSSION
The legal question of the effectiveness of an attempted assignment of deferred
payment rights grounded in a structured settlement agreement generally is
presented for court determination through one of three procedural routes. First,
under some state statutes, the settlement payee must obtain prior court approval
in order to assign his payment rights. 5 In this declaratory judgment proceeding,
the insurer making the payments can challenge the validity of the proposed
assignment on the basis of an anti-assignment clause either in the settlement
agreement, or in the annuity contract, or both. Second, in those jurisdictions
where prior court approval is not statutorily required for assignment of structured
settlement payment rights, after an assignment is attempted, the insurer may, on
the basis of an anti-assignment clause, refuse to forward the payments to the
purported assignee. The assignee then files a declaratory judgment suit seeking
to have the assignment declared effective. Third, a payee who has assigned his
payment rights may subsequently enter into bankruptcy, and the bankruptcy
trustee may attempt to establish, on the basis of an anti-assignment clause, that the
purportedly assigned payment rights are still part of the debtor's estate. All three
of these procedural routes lead to the same substantive legal question: whether the
was enforceable); Rumbin v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 757 A.2d 526, 528 (Conn. 2000) (holding that an
assignment provision that does not limit the power to assign or expressly invalidate the assignment does not
render the assignment ineffective); McKay v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., No. CV990590195S, 2000 Conn.
Super. LEXIS 840, at *9 (Conn. Mar. 29,2000) (holding that declaratory judgment approval pursuant to
local statute, which permitted sale of structured settlement payment rights only if court approved, was only
available to payees whose contracts did not forbid transfer of rights because act would otherwise
unconstitutionally impair the right to contract); Cavallaro v. SAFECO Assigned Benefits Co., No.
CV990362118S, 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3211, at *27-28 (Nov. 18, 1999) (denying declaratory
judgment to allow assignment of periodic payments under a structured settlement that prohibited
assignment); Buchanan v. Am. Mut. Life Ins. Co., No. 550420, 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3094, at *8
(Nov. 15, 1999) (granting declaratory judgment allowing the transfer of structured settlement benefit rights
despite anti-assignment provisions); Bobbitt v. SAFECO Assigned Benefits Serv. Co., No. CV990588205S,
1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2347, at *25 (Aug. 24, 1999) (denying declaratory relief to plaintiff seeking to
transfer structured settlement benefits to third party); Piasecki v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Boston, 728
N.E.2d 71, 74 (Il. App. Ct. 2000) (enforcing anti-assignment clause because it was bargained for and
consistent with the intentions of the parties); Green v. SAFECO Life Ins. Co., 727 N.E.2d 393, 397 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2000) (enforcing clause because of the plain, ordinary and clear language of the contract);
Henderson v. Roadway Express, 720 N.E.2d 1108, 1109-10 (111. App. Ct. 1999) (same); J.G. Wentworth
v. Jones, No. 1998-CA-002237-MR, 2000 Ky. App. LEXIS 38, at *8, *18 (Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2000)
(affirming trial court's holding that tort victims were unable to assign their rights under structured settlement
because tort victims were incidental third-party beneficiaries who retained none of the incidents of
ownership in the annuities); Owen v. CNA Ins./Cont'l. Cas. Co., 750 A.2d 211, 218 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2000) (remanding to determine the materiality and enforceability of non-assignment provision).
15. See supra note 10; see also Andrada, supra note 3, at 490-93.
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attempted assignment is effective given the contractual anti-assignment clause
contained in the settlement agreement or annuity contract.
Some of the courts that have addressed this issue have upheld the effectiveness
of the attempted assignments, even though they have sometimes recognized them
to constitute breaches of contract. 6 Other courts have ruled the attempted
assignments to be ineffective. 7 To some extent, the opinions apply the same
general analytical framework of statutory provisions and common law contract
principles. However, there is substantial variation in the number of issues
considered, the accuracy and thoroughness of the analysis, and the resolutions.'
A threshold issue addressed in many of these cases is whether Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC Article 9") operates to invalidate the anti-
assignment clause.2' Once this issue is disposed of-to date always in a manner
that preserves the anti-assignment clause against the Article 9 challenge2"-the
courts then turn to a more general analysis of the effectiveness of the anti-
assignment clause based on general common law contract principles.' The courts
usually pay very little attention, if any, to potential unconscionability or usury
issues in this analysis.2" Finally, in those jurisdictions that have statutorily
imposed purchaser disclosure and judicial consent limitations upon assignments
of structured settlement payment rights, the courts have (to a limited extent, and
will need to do so more extensively in the future) addressed the question of the
impact of such legislation upon the effectiveness of anti-assignment clauses.2 The
following is a more detailed discussion of each of these issues.
16. See, e.g., W. United Life Assurance Co., 64 F.2d at 843; In re Brooks, 248 B.R. at 104; In re
Terry, 245 B.R. at 428; In re Cooper, 242 B.R. at 772; In re Berghman, 235 B.R. at 691; Wonsey, 32 F.
Supp. 2d at 944; Rumbin, 757 A.2d at 527-28; Buchanan, 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3094, at *8.
17. See, e.g., Townsend, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *2; Grieve, 58 F. Supp. 2d at 324; Johnson, 26
F. Supp. 2d at 1230; McKay, 2000 Conn. Super. LEXIS 840, at *6; Cavallaro, 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS
3211, at *27; Bobbin, 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2345, at *25; Piasecki, 728 N.E.2d at 74; Green, 727
N.E.2d at 397; Henderson, 720 N.E.2d at 1110; J.G. Wentworth, 2000 Ky. App. LEXIS 38, at *12;
Liberty Life Assurance Co., 93 F. Supp. 2d at 638.
18. See infra notes 26-31.
19. Id.





A. The Article 9 Question
Article 9 of the UCC has been enacted into law in almost all jurisdictions.25
UCC section 9-318(4) declares that contract terms that prohibit assignment of an
account are ineffective.26 If payment rights under a structured settlement
agreement qualify as an Article 9 "account," this section would appear to render
anti-assignment clauses per se ineffective to invalidate assignments. This would
obviate the necessity for undertaking a more general analysis of the implications
of other statutory limitations or common law principles upon the effectiveness of
anti-assignment clauses.
There is, however, a real question as to whether UCC Article 9 governs
assignment of payment rights under structured settlement agreements. First, it is
not clear whether such payment rights qualify as "accounts" under the Article 9
definition of that term, which is primarily designed to cover payment obligations
arising out of ordinary commercial transactions. This definition expressly limits
the scope of the term "account" to the "right to payment for goods sold or leased
or for services rendered which is not evidenced by an instrument.. ,2" Second,
while section 9-102(l)(b) declares that Article 9 generally applies to "any sale of
accounts, '2 it also expressly refers to the exclusion of certain accounts from
Article 9 coverage that is provided by section 9-104.29 Most significantly, section
9-104(g) excludes any "transfer of an interest in or claim in or under any policy
of insurance, except as provided with respect to proceeds.. ,3" Section 9-104(k)
excludes any "transfer in whole or in part of any claim arising out of tort."'"
Many-perhaps most-courts that have considered the assignability of
structured settlement proceeds in the face of anti-assignment clauses have made
no reference in their analysis to any possible Article 9 issues.32 While this
omission suggests that those courts found Article 9 to be inapplicable, it sheds no
light upon the underlying rationale for this conclusion.
Those courts that have explicitly addressed the Article 9 question have
uniformly found it to be inapplicable, although their rationales vary. One court,
for example, analyzed whether structured settlement payment obligations
25. RONALD A. ANDERSON, 8 THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 440 § 9-101.2 (3d ed. 1985) (stating
that the Uniform Commercial Code has been enacted in every state with the exception of Louisiana and has
also been enacted in the U.S. Virgin Islands).
26. U.C.C. § 9-318(4) (2000).
27. U.C.C. § 9-106 (2000). "'Account' means any right to payment for goods sold or leased or for
services rendered .... " Id.
28. U.C.C. § 9-102(l)(b) (2000).
29. U.C.C. § 9-102(l) (2000); see also U.C.C. § 9-104 (2000).
30. U.C.C. § 9-104(g) (2000).
31. U.C.C. § 9-104(k) (2000).
32. See generally Rumbin v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 757 A.2d 526 (Conn. 2000) (omitting Article 9
issues); Piasecki v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Boston, 728 N.E.2d 71 (111. App. Ct. 2000) (same).
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constitute "accounts" under Article 9, and determined that they did not.33 A
significant number of courts that have considered the Article 9 issue, however,
implicitly assume that structured settlement payment obligations do qualify as
accounts.' At the same time, courts have concluded that structured settlement
payment rights are nevertheless not governed by Article 9.35 Courts have reasoned
that the annuity-like character of a right to a stream of payments from an
insurance company make the structured settlement economically and legally
equivalent to an interest in an insurance policy which, as noted above, is
specifically excluded from Article 9 coverage by section 9-104(g).36 Finally, at
least one court considering the question concluded that structured settlement
payments were excluded from Article 9 coverage by the section 9-104(k) exclusion
of "claim[s] arising out of tort" on the basis that, even though a settlement
agreement is a contract, the proceeds of the settlement of a tort claim arise out of
that tort claim.37 However, the opinion also recognized that some authority takes
a contrary position.38
This article argues that the courts are correct in their conclusion, whether
implicit or explicit, that Article 9 does not govern the assignment of payment
obligations under structured settlement agreements. Courts have offered three
major alternative rationales to support this proposition: (1) that such payment
rights are not "accounts";39 (2) that even if payment rights are deemed to be
accounts they are of the nature of an interest in an insurance policy;4' and (3) in
any event, they arise out of a tort claim.4' Any one of these rationales is
33. See Bobbitt v. SAFECO Assigned Benefits Co., No. 9905882055, 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS
3724, at *11 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 24, 1999) (relying on § 9-106 definition of "account" to find that
"[tihis transaction does not involve an account").
34. See, e.g., Cavallaro v. SAFECO Assigned Benefits Co., CV 9903621185, 1999 Conn. Super.
LEXIS 3211, at "8-11 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 18, 1999) (analyzing Article 9 issues as though "account"
section applied).
35. See id. at* 10 (holding Article 9 inapplicableon groundsthat the transaction did not "seek to create
a security interest in the payment right).
36. See Wonsey v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 32 F. Supp. 2d 939, 942 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (because
settlement obligor funded payments with annuity and because annuity contracts and insurance policies are
governed by the same statute, Article 9 is inapplicable).
37. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Della Indus., 998 F. Supp. 159, 162-64 (D. Conn. 1998), vacated by 229
F.3d 1135 (2d Cir. 1999); Owen v. CNA Ins./Cont'l Gas Co., 750 A.2d 211,214-15 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2000).
38. See Owen, 750 A.2d at 214-15; Della, 998 F. Supp. at 164 (quoting Amanda K. Esquibel,An
Article 9 Primer Regarding Uninsured Collateral Destroyed by a Tortfeasor, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 211,
215 (1998) ("[Tlhe [U.C.C.] drafters intended no exception for proceeds of tort claims.")).
39. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
40. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
41. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
reasonable and, alone, is a sufficient basis for this conclusion.42 Therefore, the
Article 9 invalidation of restrictions on the assignment of accounts is not properly
relevant to the issues arising in the structured settlement assignment context.
B. The Effectiveness of Anti-Assignment Clauses.
The greatest variation in these cases is in their application of general common
law contract doctrines to the question of the effectiveness of the attempted
assignment. In American law, there is a basic tension between freedom of contract
principles and concerns about restraints on alienation.43 This tension has become
sharper in recent years as the adverse consequences of restraints on alienation
have become better appreciated." This tension is evidenced in the present context
as well as elsewhere in the law by inconsistent rulings and conflicting rationales.
1. The Available Interpretive Options
As a general matter, there are at least four different ways that courts could
reasonably construe anti-assignment clauses in contracts, each resulting in a
different balance between freedom of contract principles and restraint on
alienation concerns.
45
First, courts could regard anti-assignment clauses as wholly ineffective to
impose any duties on the obligee or to bar assignments, in which case an
attempted assignment would be effective if it satisfied any non-materiality
limitations or other applicable criteria for effective assignments, and would also
42. But see Am. Bank of Commerce v. City of McAlester, 555 P.2d 581,584-85 (Okla. 1976) (finding
a legislative purpose in adopting UCC section 9-318 to bar all anti-assignment clauses, even in situations
not subject to Article 9).
43. See, e.g., JOHN MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRAcTS 807 (3d ed. 1990).
To what extent the parties to a contract can, by agreement, effectively prohibit or restrict the
assignment of rights or duties created by the contract that would otherwise be assignable is a
question upon which the courts, over the years, have demonstrated some confusion.... The
conflict between the policy of freedom of contract and the policy precluding restraints upon
alienation is painfully obvious.
Id.
44. Compare MURRAY, supra note 43, at 807 and FARNSWORTH, infra note 51, at 713 with the
following quote from a 1954 American LawReports Annotated: "[N]onassignment provisions of bilateral
contracts.., have almost invariably been upheld as fully valid .... [However, a few] cases more or less
distinctly adhere to the proposition that contracting parties cannot by a mere nonassignment provision
prevent the effectual alienation of the right to money which becomes due under the contract." W.W. Allen,
Annotation, Validity of Anti-Assignment Clause in Contract, 37 A.L.R.2d 1251, 1253-58 (1954).
45. Other sources and commentators advance similar discussions of anti-assignment provision
effectiveness. See Cedar Point Apartments v. Cedar Point Inv. Corp., 693 F.2d 748, 754 & n.4 (8th Cir.
1982) (discussing with approval the analyses in JOHN MURRAY, JR. MURRAY on CoNTRAcrs § 306 (2d rev.
ed. 1974) and Grover Grismore, Effect of a Restriction on Assignment in Contract, 31 MicH. L. REv. 299
(1933)).
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not constitute a breach of contract.' This interpretation would not only
completely eliminate the restraint on alienation features of such clauses, but would
also completely override the parties' freedom to contract for assignability
restrictions.
Second, the courts could also regard anti-assignment clauses as enforceable
promises made by the obligee, but not as bars to effective assignments.47 In this
case, an attempted assignment would be effective if it satisfied any non-materiality
limitation or other applicable criteria for effective assignments, but would still
constitute a breach of contract.' The obligor's remedy would be limited to a suit
for damages,49 largely (but not completely) restricting the parties' freedom to
contract for assignability restrictions.
Third, courts could regard anti-assignment clauses as making attempted
assignments ineffective, rendering an attempted assignment of payment rights
ineffective and not a breach of contract.' Such an interpretation would allow the
parties full freedom to contractually impose restraints on alienation.
Finally, courts could regard anti-assignment clauses as making an attempted
assignment an act that terminates the entire contract, in which case the attempted
assignment would be ineffective, would constitute a breach of contract, and would
discharge the obligor from his remaining obligations. Such an interpretation, as
a practical matter, would completely preclude assignments, effectively allowing
the parties to contractually impose restraints on alienation.
Although all of the above general interpretive approaches have been followed
upon occasion, most courts addressing the question of the effectiveness of anti-
assignment clauses have utilized either the second or third interpretation to strike
what they regard as the appropriate balance between the conflicting policy
objectives." Probably the most substantial body of authority is in favor of applying
46. This approach essentially disregards the anti-assignment provision, leaving the court to consider the
attempted assignment under generally applicable contract principles. See generally MURRAY, supra note
43, at §§ 135-42.
47. See MURRAY, supra note 43, at 807. This alternative corresponds to (I) in his discussion. See also
Grismore, supra note 45, at 300. This alternative corresponds to (1) there also.
48. See Grismore, supra note 45, at 300.
49. See id.
50. See MURRAY, supra note 43, at 807. This alternative corresponds to Murray's (3). See also
Grismore, supra note 45, at 300. This alternative corresponds to Grismore's (2).
5 I. See E. Au.AN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 717 (Richard A. Epstein et al. eds., 3d ed. 1999).
Sometimes parties include in their contract a term prohibiting assignment. Absent statute, most
courts have upheld such terms as precluding effective assignment, favoring freedom of contract
over free assignability. However, such anti-assignment clauses have been narrowly construed
where possible. Thus they are often read as imposing a duty on the assignor not to assign, but
are not read as making an assignment invalid.
Id (footnotes omitted); see also JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 684
the second interpretation to enforce anti-assignment clauses but minimizing their
restraint on alienation consequences by interpreting them whenever reasonably
possible as only imposing a duty not to assign and not also rendering this
attempted assignment ineffective.
2. The Restatement Approach
Turning to the structured settlement assignment cases, the courts here clearly
recognize the basic principle that contract provisions should generally be enforced
in some fashion,52 including anti-assignment provisions.53 There is, however, also
fairly broad acceptance of the competing principle that anti-assignment clauses
constitute impediments to the free alienability of contract rights, and, therefore,
should be construed narrowly to limit their adverse economic effects.' In
attempting to balance freedom of contract principles with restraint on alienability
concerns, most courts have applied sections 317 and 322 of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts55 in structured settlement assignment cases.' A smaller but
(4thied. 1998) ("[Courts] have often emasculated the [anti-assignment] provision by holding it to be merely
a promise not to assign. Under such a construction an assignment is effective, but the obligor has a cause
of action against the assignor for breach of contract.") (citations omitted).
52. See Johnson v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 26 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1229 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (stating that
it is well settled that courts should strive to adhere to terms agreed upon by the parties in a contract); see
also Grieve v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 58 F. Supp. 2d 319, 322-24 (D. Vt. 1999) (stating that enforcement
of contractual terms as written is important as a matter of public policy).
53. See Townsend v. Hartford Life Ins., No. 97-C-3232-W, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21783, at *5 (N.D.
Ala. June 30, 1999) (holding that the anti-assignment provision is "clear and unambiguous," and
enforceable under state law); see also Johnson, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 1229 (stating that an anti-assignability
clause is routinely enforced).
54. See Rumbin v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 757 A.2d 526, 531 (Conn. 2000) (stating that, because free
assignability is important, anti-assignment clauses should be construed narrowly whenever possible); see
also In re Cooper, 242 B.R. at 771 (S.D. Ga. 1999) (stating that the modern trend is to interpret anti-
assignment clauses narrowly); Wonsey v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 32 F. Supp. 2d 939, 943 (E.D. Mich.
1998) ("[T]he modem trend with respect to contractual prohibitions on assignments is to interpret these
clauses narrowly .... ) (emphasis in original).
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: ASSIGNMENT OF RIGHTS § 317 (1981); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: PROHIBITION OF ASSIGNMENT § 322 (1981).
56. See, e.g., In re Terry, 245 B.R. 422,426-27 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2000) (declaring the assignment
effective); In re Cooper, 242 B.R. at 771 (declaring the assignment effective); In re Berghman, 235 B.R.
683,690-91 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999) (declaring the assignment effective); In re Freeman, 232 B.R. 497,
503 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999) (declaring the assignment effective); Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Boston
v. Stone St. Capital, Inc., 93 F. Supp. 2d 630, 637 (D. Md. 2000) (declaring the assignment ineffective);
Wonsey, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 944 (declaring the assignment effective); Grieve, 58 F. Supp. 2d at 324
(declaring the assignment ineffective); Rumbin, 757 A.2d at 531 (declaring the assignment effective);
Cavallaro v. SAFECO Assigned Benefits Co., No.990362118S, 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3211, at *25-
*26 (Nov. 18, 1999) (declaring the assignment ineffective); Bobbitt v. SAFECO Assigned Benefits Serv.
Co., No. 990588205S, 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2347, at *25 (Aug. 24, 1999) (declaring the assignment
effective); Piasecki v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Boston, 728 N.E.2d 71, 73-74 (III. App. Ct. 2000)
(declaring the assignment ineffective); Henderson v. Roadway Express, 720 N.E.2d 1108, 1113 (11. App.
Ct. 1999) (declaring the assignment ineffective); Owen v. CNA Ins./Cont'l Cas. Co., 750 A.2d 211, 218
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000) (remanding for further inquiry).
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still significant proportion of the cases, however, resolve the issue of the
effectiveness of the attempted assignment without reference to Restatement
sections 317 or 322. Some of these rulings find the attempted assignment
effective, while others find it to be ineffective.57
These Restatement provisions are unfortunately not models of clarity, and
their application in this area has been inconsistent. While the Restatement
provisions together appear to rule out the blanket disregard of anti-assignment
limitations noted above as the first possible interpreting option, the provisions'
broad phrasing and gaps in coverage leave available all of the other three
interpretive options with their very different consequences.58 Some of the cases
that apply those provisions uphold the effectiveness of the attempted assignment,
while other cases hold the attempted assignment ineffective under virtually
identical factual circumstances.59 This Article will first summarize Restatement
sections 317 and 322, highlight their gaps and ambiguities, and suggest their
proper application. The Article will then consider the judicial application of those
provisions in this particular context.
Restatement section 317 endorses the free assignment of contractual rights'
unless: under section 317(2)(a), the assignment "would materially change the duty
of the obligor, or materially increase the burden or risk imposed on him by his
contract"; under section 317(2)(b), "the assignment is forbidden by statute or is
otherwise inoperative on grounds of public policy;" or under section 317(2)(c), the
"assignment is validly precluded by contract."'"
The general character of the section 317(2)(a) materiality limitation seems
clear, yet difficulties inhere in its application. The "forbidden by statute"
57. See, e.g., W. United Life Assurance Co. v. Hayden, 64 F.3d 833, 842-43 (3d Cir. 1995) (declaring
the assignment effective); Townsend, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21783, at *4 (declaring the attempted
assignment ineffective under Connecticut law because the anti-assignment provision was "clear and
unambiguous."); Johnson, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 1230 (declaring the attempted assignment ineffective, stating
that "[tihe nonassignability clause is simply a condition of the contract, for which the parties bargained, and
upon which defendants have a right to rely."); In Re Brooks, 248 B.R. 99, 105 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2000)
(declaring the assignment effective because of the narrow scope of the anti-assignment clause); McKay v.
Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., No.990590195S, 2000 Conn. Super. LEXIS 840, at *8-10 (Mar. 29, 2000)
(declaring the assignment ineffective because of the presence of an anti-assignment clause); Buchanan v.
Am. Mut. Life Ins. Co., No. 550420, 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3094, at *8 (Nov. 15, 1999) (declaring
the assignment effective because of an applicable Connecticut statute); Green v. SAFECO Life Ins. Co., 727
N.E.2d 393,397 (11. App. Ct. 2000) (declaring the assignment ineffective); Wentworth v. Jones, No. 1998-
CA-002237-MR, 2000 Ky. App. LEXIS 38, at *10-17 (Apr. 14, 2000) (declaring the assignment
ineffective based on applicable federal and Kentucky statutes, and public policy considerations).
58. See supra Part II.B.1.
59. See generally cases cited supra note 56.
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 317(2) (1981).
61. Id. at § 317(2)(a)-(c).
provision of section 317(2)(b) is primarily intended to recognize statutory
limitations placed upon the assignment of a letter of credit rights, wages, or
government contracts,62 none of which are implicated in the structured settlement
context. Here, the only potentially applicable statutory limitations are the Article
9 issues previously discussed63 and the purchaser disclosure and prior judicial
consent statutes that will be discussed later.'
The primary purpose of the public policy provision in section 317(2)(b) is to
provide courts with a basis for invalidating assignments on the paternalistic
grounds that they are unconscionable or usurious to the assignor.65 Normally the
unconscionability or usury defenses would be raised by a party to the agreement
being challenged, but in this context, both parties to the assignment agreement
wish it to be given effect, and it is the third party obligor who seeks to have it
invalidated.'e Such a third party would arguably lack standing to raise an
unconscionability or usury defense to enforcement of an agreement to which it is
not a party.6 7 Therefore, the public policy provision of section 317(2)(b) is
principally necessary to give proper consideration to paternalistic concerns for the
long-term welfare of the structured settlement payment recipients, as some
commentators argue is crucially important in this context.
68
To determine when a contract validly precludes assignment as required by
section 317(2)(c), one must turn to section 322.69 Under section 322(2)(a),
"unless a different intention is manifested," an anti-assignment clause "does not
forbid assignment of a right ... arising out of the assignor's due performance of
his entire obligation."'7 Furthermore, section 322(2)(b) "gives the obligor a right
to damages for breach of the terms forbidding assignment but does not render the
assignment ineffective."'7' Also, under section 322(2)(c), such an anti-assignment
clause "is for the benefit of the obligor, and does not prevent the assignee from
acquiring rights against the assignor or the obligor from discharging his duty as
if there were no such prohibition. 72
The framework created by sections 317 and 322, taken together, leaves many
issues unresolved. First, it is unclear whether section 317(2) makes effective all
62. Id. at § 317 cmt. e.
63. See supra notes 25-42 and accompanying text.
64. See infra notes 188-90 and accompanying text.
65. See Grieve v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 58 F. Supp. 2d 322, 327 (D. Vt. 1999) (noting that
assignment threatens "the injured person's long-term financial security" as part of its analysis under the
Restatement framework).
66. See, e.g., id. at 320.
67. But see Rumbin v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 757 A.2d 526,529 n.4 (Conn. 2000) (acknowledging this
argument but finding obligor's standing to have been provided by statute).
68. See Corboy, supra note 4; Shoop, supra note 4.
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 317 cmt. f (1981) ("The effect of a term in a contract
forbidding the assignment of rights arising under the contract is the subject of § 322.").
70. Id. at § 322(2)(a).
71. Id. at§ 322(2)(b).
72. Id. at § 322(2)(c).
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attempted assignments that do not materially and adversely impact the obligor or
conflict with applicable statutes or public policy concerns, even where anti-
assignment terms exist in the contract.73 The policy of minimizing restraints on
alienation suggests that such an interpretation would be desirable.74 However, the
disjunctive language of that provision itself suggests that the materiality criterion
is properly applicable only when assignment is not barred on statutory or public
policy grounds, or validly precluded by the contract, and that the presence of a
valid contractual preclusion ends the inquiry and any attempted assignment is
ineffective."
However, as noted above, anti-assignment clauses are not per se valid
preclusions of assignments under section 322(2). Rather, anti-assignment clauses
only have the lesser effect of conferring a right to damages upon the obligor, and
do not also render the assignment ineffective "unless a different intention is
manifested."76  It is unclear what kind of evidence should be required to
demonstrate the manifestation of a different intention. In particular, a question
exists whether attention should be focused primarily on the precise language of the
clause at issue-drawing very fine distinctions among, for example, clauses that
merely state that assignments are "prohibited," clauses that instead describe
assignments as "void" or "invalid," and clauses which may specify that non-
assignment is a condition precedent of the obligor's duties77-or instead should be
73. See id. at § 317(2) and § 317 cmt. f.
74. See id. at § 317 cmt. f.
75. See id. However, this seemingly straightforward understanding of the drafters' intent is somewhat
compromised by the extraordinarily confusing language of comment f to section 317:
The effect of a term in a contract forbidding the assignment of rights arising under the contract
is the subject of section 322. Such a term may resolve doubts as to whether an assignment
violates paragraph (2)(a) of this Section. Where it seems to forbid an assignment clearly outside
the scope of paragraph (2)(a), it may be read restrictively to permit the assignment, or to give
the obligor a claim against the assignor rather than a defense against the assignee, or the term
may be invalid by statute or decision.
Id.
76. Id. at § 322. It is also unclear whether section 317 has any bearing on whether an effective
assignment done in the face of an anti-assignment clause that is not a valid preclusion under section
317(2)(c) is nevertheless a breach ofcontract. Section 322(2)(b) would suggest that it would be a breach.
Presumably, if it was a breach of contract the required showing of non-materiality to make the assignment
effective under Section 317(2)(a) would also prevent that breach from justifying the obligor's subsequent
non-performance. See id. at § 322.
77. Id. "If, however, the [anti-assignment] provision expressly states thatany assignment shall be void,
or uses other equivalent language, the courts have generally held that the purported assignment is
ineffective, unless the obligor consents to the assignment." CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 51, at 684-
85; see also Rumbin v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 757 A.2d 526,531-34 (Conn. 2000). But see MuRRAY, supra
note 43, at 807-08 ("Many of the decided cases have not differentiated between [different kinds of
prohibitory language in anti-assignment clauses] .. .and have assumed that, whatever the form, the
stipulation either did or did not invalidate the assignment depending upon the court's view of public policy
focused more upon the circumstances surrounding negotiations and the light they
shed upon probable intentions of the parties.78
Section 322(2) also fails to address the possibility that a statute may be in
force which limits the effectiveness of anti-assignment clauses regardless of the
intention of the parties.79 This is a somewhat surprising omission given that
section 317(2)(b) expressly addresses the opposite possibility of statutory
limitations on assignability.s' It is reasonable to read the section 322(2)
specification of the consequences of anti-assignment clauses as subject to any
applicable statutes that would further reduce their effect. However, given the
explicit inclusion of statutory impacts in section 317(2)(b), the proper interpreta-
tion of section 322(2) is open to some question.8'
Even if section 322(2)(a) or (b) apply to make a particular assignment in the
face of an anti-assignment prohibition not "forbidden" or "ineffective," hence not
"validly precluded by contract" under section 317(2)(c), questions remain.82 First,
does this determination alone make the assignment effective, or must the non-
materiality and statutes/public policy criteria be satisfied as well? 3 Neither section
317 nor section 322 address the obligor's right to treat a material violation of an
anti-assignment clause as a basis for justified non-performance, rather than merely
as a basis for the award of damages.' This suggests that the Restatement drafters
intended to subject all attempted assignments to the non-materiality criterion, not
allowing assignments whenever it would have material adverse consequences for
the obligor such as would justify non-performance,85 and that the review of the
effect of contractual prohibitions on assignment under section 322 was not
intended to preclude this subsequent materiality inquiry (nor the statute/public
policy inquiry) where those prohibitions are ineffective to preclude assignment.86
Second, it is not clear from the sparse "public policy" language of section
317(2)(b) how aggressive the courts should be in over-riding assignors' decisions
as to the acceptability of assignment terms on the basis of paternalistic concerns
for assignors' long-term welfare.87
..... ); see generally Grover C. Grismore, Effect of a Restriction on Assignment in a C6ntract, 31 MICH.
L. REV. 299 (1933).
78. See Grismore, supra note 45, at 318 (favoring a focus upon the wording of the particular clause).
But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 322 cmt. c (1981) ("The rules stated in this Section do
not exhaust the factors to be taken into account in construing and applying a prohibition against assignment.
... Where there is a promise not to assign but no provision that an assignment is ineffective, the question
whether breach of the promise discharges the obligor's duty depends on all the circumstances.").
79. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 322(2)(1981).
80. See id. at §§ 317(2)(b), 322(2).
81. See id.
82. Id. at §§ 317(2)(c), 322(2)(a).
83. See id. at § 317(2)(a)-(b).
84. See id. at §§ 317, 322.
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See id. at § 317(2)(b).
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Finally, under section 322(2)(c), it is not entirely clear that when an
assignment is "not... ineffective" under section 322(2)(b), the assignee then has
a right to enforce it against the obligor, rather than merely to seek damages from
the assignor for the obligor's unwillingness to cooperate." Section 322(2)(c)
specifically preserves assignee rights against the assignor (unless a different
intention is manifested), but does not discuss assignee rights against the obligor
to enforce the obligor's continuing performance.89 However, the thrust of the
provision merely allows the obligor to waive an anti-assignment clause at his
election and proceed as though no contractual limitations existed.' Section
322(2)(c) does not appear to limit in any way assignee enforcement rights against
the obligor following "not ... ineffective" assignments that violate anti-assign-
ment provisions. 9
Thus, the Restatement framework established by sections 317 and 322 is more
complex and subtle than it first appears, and leaves open great flexibility with its
materiality, public policy, and "different intention manifested" provisions. The
logical analytical sequence the courts should follow in applying these Restatement
provisions in this context is to first determine whether, in light of the "different
intention is manifested" language of section 322(2),' the anti-assignment clause
of the structured settlement agreement at issue has "validly precluded" assignment
under section 317(2)(c).93 If so, the assignment would be ineffective. The court
would then neither inquire into the materiality of the burden that an assignment
would impose upon the payment obligor under section 317(2)(a), nor inquire into
the existence of conflicts with statutes or public policy concerns under section
317(2)(b).
If the court concludes that the section 322(2) "different intention is mani-
fested" requirement for an anti-assignment clause having preclusive effects is not
met, then section 317(2)(c) would not apply. The key issues would become
whether the assignment imposes a material burden or risk upon the obligor under
section 317(2)(a), and whether it conflicts with applicable statutes or public
policies under section 317(2)(b). If either is the case, the assignment should be
ruled ineffective. If neither is the case, the assignment should be ruled effective,
and the assignee should have full rights to enforce the assignment against both the
assignor and the obligor, and the obligor should be limited to damages for breach
of the anti-assignment clause, if any can be shown.
88. Id. at § 322(2)(b)-(c).
89. See id. at § 322(2)(c).
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id. at §§ 317, 322.
93. See id. at § 317(2)(c).
3. Judicial Application of the Restatement Approach
Having discussed the underlying policy concerns and various interpretive
options available for construing anti-assignment clauses, and having examined the
Restatement provisions that most courts favor in interpreting such clauses in the
structured settlement context, this Article will now consider more than a dozen
recent court opinions in this area that have applied these Restatement provisions.'
While some of the court opinions that have invoked Restatement sections 317
and 322 have done so only in passing and without engaging in significant analysis
of their application,95 a number of cases have carried out a more complete analysis.
One such case is Grieve v. General American Life Insurance Co.,' a federal
District Court opinion which has subsequently been cited by a number of other
cases decided in this area.97 In Grieve, the plaintiff entered into a structured
settlement agreement of her tort claim with Concord Group Insurance Company,
the tortfeasor's primary insurer.9" Under this agreement, Concord assigned its
obligation to General American Life Insurance Company, which then purchased
an annuity from Integrity Life Insurance Company to fund the payment obliga-
tions, with Integrity to mail the payments directly to Grieve."
Grieve later attempted to assign a portion of her payment rights under the
settlement to Singer Asset Financial Company in exchange for a discounted lump
sum."° Integrity, however, refused to forward the payments to Singer, citing the
express prohibition of the assignment of Grieve's payment rights contained in the
94. See supra note 56.
95. See, e.g., In re Terry, 245 B.R. 422, 426 n.9, 427 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2000) (briefly discussing
section 317(2) and 322(1), but finding assignment effective); In re Cooper, 242 B.R. 767, 771 n.4 (S.D.
Ga. 2000) (providing some limited discussion of section 322, but finding assignment effective); In re
Berghman, 235 B.R. 683,690-91 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999) (providing some limited discussion of section
322, but finding assignment effective); In re Freeman, 232 B.R. 497, 502 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999)
(providing some limited discussion of section 322, but finding assignment effective); Bobbitt v. SAFECO
Assigned Benefits Co., No. 990588205S 1999 Conn. Super. Lexis 2347, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 24,
1999) (providing some limited discussion of section 317(2), but finding assignment ineffective).
96. 58 F. Supp. 2d 319 (1). Vt. 1999).
97. See, e.g., Settlement Funding v. Jamestown Life Ins. Co., 78 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1359-60 (N.D. Ga.
1999); In re Cooper, 242 B.R. at 772; Rumbin v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co. , 757 A.2d 526, 533 n.9 (Conn.
2000); Cavallaro v. SAFECO Assigned Benefits Co., No. 990362118S, 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3211,
at *22-23 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 18,1999); Buchanan v. Am. Mut. Life Ins. Co., No. 550420,1999 Conn.
Super. LEXIS 3094, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 15, 1999); Bobbitt, 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2347 at
*5-12; Piasecki v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Boston, 728 N.E.2d 71, 73 (III. App. Ct. 2000);
Henderson v. Roadway Express, 720 N.E.2d 1108, 1112 (111. App. Ct.); Wentworth v. Jones, No. 1998-CA-
002237-MR, 200 Ky. App. LEXIS 38, at *10 (Ky. Ct. App. Apr. 14,2000); Owen v. CNA Ins. Co., 750
A.2d 211,215 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000).
98. Grieve, 58 F. Supp. 2d at 320-21.
99. Id.at321.
100. Id. Under this agreement, Grieve was to receive the sum of $39,682 in exchange for giving up a
total of$104,800 in 180 monthly payments and several deferred lump sum payments, which was equivalent
to an interest rate of 18.8% compounded daily on the sum advanced to her. Id.
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settlement agreement.' 0' Grieve, in turn, filed a motion for declaratory judgment
seeking to establish the effectiveness of the assignment."
The District Court applied Vermont law to decide the case."°3 It first stated
that while debts were generally assignable under Vermont law," the limitations
on assignments imposed by Restatement section 317(2) were applicable. 5 The
court then concluded that each of the three limitations upon assignability set forth
in section 317(2)(a), (b), and (c) were present." 6 Although, the court did not
expressly recognize that under the disjunctive language of section 317(2) any one
of those limitations alone would have been sufficient to render the assignment
ineffective, this interpretation of the provision appears to be implicit in the
opinion.' °7
With regard to the "validly precluded by contract" limitation of section
317(2)(c), the Grieve court failed to conduct an analysis of the effectiveness of the
anti-assignment provision under section 322(2)."° Instead, the court simply
assumed, without discussion, that such a provision would generally have
preclusive effect, rather than merely conferring a right to damages upon the
obligor unless the parties showed a different intent. " This assumption, however,
is in direct conflict with the more pro-assignment premise of section 322(2).'0
The court did address the potential statutory preclusion issue presented by Article
9," and concluded after some analysis that the anti-assignment provision was not
invalidated by Article 9 because structured settlement payments may be properly
regarded as insurance policies, which are excluded from the scope of Article 9 by
section 9-104(g)."12
With regard to the materiality limitation of section 317(2)(a), the Grieve court
recognized an important tax law issue." 3 Under section 104(a)(2) of the Internal
101. Id. at 321-22. The anti-assignment clause in the Grieve settlement agreement stated that "periodic
payments cannot be accelerated, deferred, increased or decreased by [Grieve] or any Payee; nor shall
[Grieve] or any Payee have the power to sell, mortgage, encumber, or anticipate the periodic payments, or
any part thereof, by assignment or otherwise." Id. at 321.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 322 n.2 (parties agreeing that Vermont law was controlling).
104. id. at 322. See also Herbert v. Jarvis, Rice & White Ins., 365 A.2d 271, 272 (Vt. 1976)
(discussing issuance of assignment order by bankruptcy court).
105. Grieve, 58 F. Supp. 2d at 322-23.
106. Id. at 323-24.
107. See id. at 324 (finding that change of recipient materially increases risk).
108. Id. at 322-24 (noting that there was no mention of section 322(2) in the assignability analysis).
109. See id.
110. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
Ill. See supra notes 26-42 and accompanying text.
112. Grieve, 58 F. Supp. 2d at 323-24.
113. Seeid. at323.
Revenue Code, "' a recipient of structured settlement payments of personal injury
damages can exclude those payments from gross income."5 Under section 130 of
the Internal Revenue Code," 6 "an entity who undertakes the responsibility for
making periodic payments" under a structured settlement may also "exclude from
its gross income the amount received for doing so, to the extent that the amount
does not exceed the cost of the funding asset, typically an annuity contract.' '"7
Among the limitations for this benefit are that the periodic payments cannot be
"'accelerated, deferred, increased or decreased by the recipient,"' and that they
must be "excludable from the gross income of the recipient under section
104(a)."' 18
The defendant in Grieve, General American, argued that if assignment was
permitted, the assignee, Singer, might "not be entitled to exclude the sums
received from its gross income under section 104(a)," and consequently the IRS
could challenge General American's eligibility for favorable tax treatment under
section 130.' ' The court concluded that while the possibility of such an adverse
consequence for General American was "open to speculation," the assignment
would nevertheless impose a material risk upon General American and was,
therefore, ineffective under Restatement section 317(2)(a). 2 °
Finally, with regard to the public policy concerns noted in section 317(2)(b),
the Grieve court concluded that allowing assignment of structured settlement
payments would permit factoring companies such as Singer to take advantage of
individuals such as Grieve by purchasing their payment rights for "a deeply
discounted lump sum payment."' 2' Such practices would imperil the assignor's
long-term financial security and consequently subvert the Congressional policy
underlying the tax advantages accorded structured settlements. 22 The court did
not, however, specifically link its concerns about abuse to traditional
unconscionability or usury principles.
23
114. 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (1988).
115. Grieve, 58 F. Supp. 2d at 323.
116. 26 U.S.C. § 130 (1988).
117. Grieve, 58 F. Supp. 2d at 323. See also 26 U.S.C. § 130 (1988).
118. Grieve, 58 F. Supp. 2d at 323 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 130(c)(2)(B), (E) (1988)).
119. Id. For an extensive discussion of this tax issue, see generally Andrada, supra note 3, at 481-90.
Andrada regards the risk of adverse IRS action on this question as "extremely small." Id. at 487.
120. Id. ("[T]he change of recipient materially increases a risk to General American, and as a result
materially reduces the value of the contract.").
121. Id. at 324. The court seemed particularly incensed by the implicit 18.8% interest rate Singer
intended to charge Grieve for the advance: "[T]his court will not lend its approval to the voiding of
unambiguous, bargained-for contract terms in order to enable Singer to profit, at an exorbitant rate of
interest, from Grieve's [currentl financial distress." Id. One should note that the 18.8% discount rate offered
by Singer for this assignment is significantly lower than that often demanded by factoring companies for
purchasing structured settlement payments. See Corboy, supra note 4, at 116.
122. Grieve, 58 F. Supp. 2d at 324 (finding rates anywhere from twenty-eight to seventy-two percent).
123. See id. at 322-24.
[Vol. 28: 787, 2001] Selling Structured Settlements
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Wonsey v. Life Insurance Co. of North America 4 is another opinion that
utilized the Restatement framework, though it reached the opposite result. That
case has also been cited extensively.'25 Wonsey, a minor, was injured in an
automobile accident. In 1983, his parents, on his behalf, entered into a structured
settlement agreement with the defendant's insurer, Insurance Company of North
America ("INA").'26 INA funded its payment obligations to Wonsey by purchas-
ing an annuity from one of its affiliates, Life Insurance Company of North
America.'27 In 1998, Wonsey, now an adult, entered into an agreement with
Singer Asset Financial Company to assign to Singer several of his future payment
rights in exchange for a lump sum payment. 2 8 As in Grieve, the insurance
company refused to honor the assignment, citing the anti-assignment provision of
the settlement agreement, 2 9 and Wonsey filed a motion for declaratory judgment
seeking to have the assignment upheld. 30 The Wonsey court decided the case
according to Michigan law.' It first considered whether Article 9 applied to
invalidate the anti-assignment clause. It concluded that Article 9 did not
invalidate the clause because the annuity obligation constituted a "policy of
insurance." As such, section 9-104 excluded the obligations from Article 9
coverage. '32
The court then turned to both Restatement section 322 and related case law
on the question of the general validity and effect of anti-assignment clauses. 13 It
interpreted section 322 as generally calling for narrow construction of anti-
assignment clauses so that they do not necessarily invalidate assignments, in order
to minimize unfair restraints on alienation."M Without flatly declaring that the
124. 32 F. Supp. 2d 939 (E.D. Mich. 1998).
125. See, e.g., Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Boston v. Stone, 93 F. Supp. 2d 630,634 (D. Md. 2000);
Grieve, 58 F. Supp. 2d at 324; In re Brooks, 248 B.R. 99, 104 (W.D. Mich. 2000); In re Terry, 245 B.R.
422,427 (N.D. Ga. 2000); In re Cooper, 242 B.R. 767,771 (S.D. Ga. 1999); Rumbin v. Utica Mut. Ins.
Co., 757 A.2d 526, 532 (Conn. 2000); Henderson v. Roadway Express, 720 N.E.2d 1108, 1112 (111. App.
Ct. 1999).
126. Wonsey, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 939-40.
127. Id. at 940.
128. Id.
129. Id. The Wonsey settlement agreement stated in part: ".[T]he Insurance Company of North America
shall be the owner of the aforesaid annuity policy and the Plaintiffs [Wonsey] should have (1) no right to
change the beneficiary of the policy ... [and] (5) no right to assign the policy."' Id. (quoting Exhibit A to
Plaintiff's motion).
130. Id. at 939.
131. See id. at 942.
132. Id. at 941-42 (holding that an annuity contract does come within the definition of 'policy
insurance').
133. Id. at942-44.
134. Id. at 943 (following modern trend).
anti-assignment clause before it was not preclusive, the court acted on this implicit
premise and conducted an analysis of whether allowing assignment would impose
a material burden upon the obligor.'35 Interestingly, it did not invoke Restatement
section 317(2)(a) as a basis for its analysis. 136 The court concluded that the only
burden that assignment would impose upon the insurance company would be the
"necessary administrative tasks associated with the assignment's implementation,"
and that this burden was not sufficiently material to justify invalidating an
assignment in the face of the narrow approach endorsed by section 322.'
In response to the insurance company's argument that the potential for
increased exposure to tax liability under section 130 of the Internal Revenue Code
was material 35-a consideration that was influential in the later Grieve court's
finding that the attempted assignment was ineffective-the Wonsey court concluded
that the anti-assignment clause was included as a protective measure for the
benefit of Wonsey, and that "[t]here has been no showing or suggestion that the
anti-assignment clause in this case was designed as a tax benefit for [the]
defendants."'39 By doing so, the Wonsey court, in effect, added a pro-assignment
gloss to the materiality criterion; the further requirement that to bar assignment,
any material increase in risk to the obligor resulting from the assignment must
have been been anticipated, and at least in part the basis for the original inclusion
of the anti-assignment clause in the agreement.'"
Another opinion heavily cited for its Restatement analysis is Henderson v.
Roadway Express. 4' This case involved another structured settlement agreement
containing an anti-assignment provision substantively identical to the clause
presented in Grieve.42 Henderson attempted to assign a portion of his future
payments to Singer Asset Finance Corporation, and filed a petition to obtain
approval of this assignment as required by the governing Illinois law.'43 The trial
court refused to approve the assignment, citing the anti-assignment provision, and
Henderson appealed.'" He argued that under Restatement section 322(2), anti-
assignment clauses should not be read as barring assignments "unless they
explicitly state that any attempted assignment is 'void,' or 'invalid,' or 'otherwise
135. See id.
136. Id. at 943-44.
137. Id. at943.
138. The insurance company cited Johnson v. First Colonial Life Ins. Co., 26 F. Supp. 2d 1227 (C.D.
Cal. 1998), in support of its position. Id. at 944.
139. Wonsey, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 944.
140. See id.
141. 720 N.E.2d 1108 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
142. Id. at 1109. See also supra note 75 and accompanying text.
143. Id. at 1109-10 ("Section 155.34 of the Illinois Insurance Code prohibits [the] assignment of
structured settlement benefits without court approval.").
144. Id. at I11.
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ineffective."" 45
After reviewing prior case law, including the Grieve and Wonsey decisions,
the Illinois Appellate Court rejected Henderson's argumentand affirmed the lower
court ruling.' 4 The court distinguished Wonsey (while implicitly accepting the
"anticipated risk" principle articulated in that case) by concluding that the anti-
assignment clause here had been included, at least partly, for the tax liability
benefit of the insurer, and therefore the risk that assignment would impose upon
the obligor rendered the assignment ineffective. 47
The Henderson court did not explicitly apply Restatement section 3 17(2)(a)
in assessing the consequences of the tax law aspects of the assignment, and
strongly suggested that the materiality of those consequences was not essential to
the determination of the effectiveness of the assignment if the parties had such
consequences in mind when they included the anti-assignment provision in the
agreement. 4 If one reads Henderson as following Wonsey, at least to the limited
extent that it agreed that anti-assignment clauses of the sort present in the two
cases were not per se preclusive of assignments, the opinion adds a "potential
adverse consequences of assignment envisioned" limitation on the effectiveness
of assignments to the other limitations presented in Restatement sections
317(2)(a), (b), and (c). 49
The Henderson ruling was followed by two other Illinois appellate cases, both
of which also included some discussion of the applicable Restatement provisions.
In Green v. SAFECO,1 5 the trial court ruled an assignment of structured
settlement proceeds to be effective, and the insurer appealed. 5 ' The Illinois
Appellate Court reversed, explicitly following the rationale of Henderson and
holding the assignment ineffective.'52 Green made an argument not presented in
Henderson that while under Restatement section 317(2) the assignment should be
ruled ineffective if it is "validly precluded by contract,"' 5 3 under section 322 a
145. Id. at 110-11. This is presumably the basis that such language was needed to satisfy the "unless
a different intention is manifested" clause of that provision. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF CONTRACTS
§ 322(2) (1981).
146. Henderson, 720 N.E.2d at 1112-13 (reasoning that because anti-assignment provision was
bargained for with intent of benefitting all parties, it was, therefore, enforceable).
147. See id. at 1112-13.
148. Id. at 1113 ("[m]ore important than whether these [section 130] tax concerns are real or will
actually arise is the fact that the parties implemented the anti-assignment provisions with these concerns in
mind.").
149. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
150. 727 N.E.2d 393 (II1. App. Ct. 2000).
151. Id. at 395.
152. Id. at 396-97.
153. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 317(2)(c) (1981).
"term prohibiting assignment of 'the contract"' bars only delegations of duties and
not assignments of rights." 4 The Green court, however, rejected this argument,
noting that the anti-assignment provision referred to payment rights and not to the
assignor's duties.'55
The other Illinois Appellate Court case following Henderson was Piasecki v.
Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Boston. '56 As in Green, the trial court had allowed
the assignment, and the insurer appealed.'57 The appellees argued that the anti-
assignment clause should be ruled unenforceable under Illinois law because it
conflicted with Restatement section 317(2), which generally permits assignments
unless a specific showing can be made under 317 (2)(a), (b), or (c). 5 The insurer
countered that under section 317(2)(a), the assignment should be precluded
because of the potential material adverse tax consequences under Section 130 of
the Internal Revenue Code.' The Illinois Appellate Court again reversed,
following Henderson's recognition of the insurer's material increase in tax risk.
The court noted that, in the present case, the parties had clearly contemplated
those tax benefits when they entered into the contract. 1"°
In Owen v. CNA,' 6' a New Jersey appellate case, the plaintiff sought to have
her assignment ruled effective. She was awarded summary judgment in her
declaratory action, and the insurer appealed. 6 The clause at issue stated that the
structured settlement payments "shall not be subject to assignment."'63 The New
Jersey Appellate Court first ruled that the anti-assignment provision was not
invalidated by Article 9. The court reasoned that the payments arose out of the
settlement of a tort claim and, therefore, were excluded from Article 9 coverage
by section 9-104(k)."M
The Owen court then discussed and applied Restatement sections 317(2)(a)
and 322(2), showing an unusually clear understanding of their meaning and
import. 65 The court noted that the Restatement's provisions in conjunction with
relevant New Jersey case law favored allowing assignments unless it would have
material adverse consequences for the obligor, or unless the parties' intentions
indicated otherwise."66 Accordingly, the case was remanded for "further
proceedings relating to the materiality and enforceability of the provision
154. Green, 2000 11. App. Ct. LEXIS at *18.
155. Id.
156. 728 N.E.2d 71 (111. App. Ct. 2000).
157. Id. at72.
158. Id. at 73.
159. Id.
160. 'Id. at 73-74 (finding the assignment ineffective).
161. 750 A.2d 211 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000).
162. Id. at 212.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 214-15 (finding Article 9's express exclusion of tort claims includes the proceeds of such a
claim).
165. See id. at 217-18.
166. Id. at 218.
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governing the non-assignability of the structured settlement." 67
In the recent federal District Court case of Liberty Life Assurance Co. of
Boston v. Stone Street Capital, Inc.,"6 the court, following Missouri law, upheld
an anti-assignment clause, thereby rendering the attempted assignment of
structured settlement proceeds ineffective."6 The insurer made the now-familiar
argument under Restatement section 317(2)(a) that allowing assignment would
expose them to the material risk of the loss of their tax benefits under section 130
of the Internal Revenue Code. " The assignor attempted to counter this argument
creatively by citing both an IRS private letter ruling in which the IRS had given
"no action" assurances to an individual that assignment by him of his structured
settlement payment rights would not affect his tax status under section
104(a)(2), 7' and an opinion letter prepared by Pricewaterhouse Coopers to the
same effect.' The court, however, rejected the assignor's argument, noting that
the IRS private letter ruling had specifically declined to address the section 130
issue. Moreover, the ruling was addressed only to the taxpayer who had requested
it and had no legal standing as precedent in other matters.'73 The court also
rejected the authority of the Pricewaterhouse Coopers letter as a definitive
resolution of the section 130 issue.174
The Liberty Life court also addressed the question of whether the attempted
assignment was validly precluded by contract under Restatement section 317(2)(c),
without regard to its materiality. 75 The court considered section 322(2)(b), and
recognized that this section required that the parties' intention to bar assignment,
rather than merely allow damages for breach, had to be shown to preclude
assignment under section 317(2)(c).'76 The court concluded that the particular
language of the anti-assignment provision sufficiently demonstrated such an
intention.'77 This conclusion, however, is suspect because the language at issue
was not unusually precise or restrictive, but rather was the conventional anti-
167. Id.
168. 93 F. Supp. 2d 630 (D. Md. 2000).
169. Id. at 638.
170. Id. at 634-35.
171. Id. at 635-36 (citing Priv. Ltr. Rul. 119273-97 (June 10, 1999)).
172. Id. at 636.
173. Id. at636-37.
174. Id. at 636 (stating that opinion letter was just that-an opinion).
175. Id. at 637.
176. Id.
177. The anti-assignment provision stated in part: "nor shall [the assignor] have the power to sell,
mortgage, encumber, [or anticipate the periodic payments,] or [sic] any part thereof, by assignment or
otherwise." Id.
assignment phrasing of the "shall not assign" variety,"7 such as was the focus of
the Grieve and Wonsey cases.'79
Another case involving the Restatement principles is Cavallaro v.
SAFECO.8 ° Cavallaro filed a motion for declaratory judgment seeking to
effectuate his attempted assignment of a portion of his annuity payments under a
structured settlement agreement to Stone Street Capital, Inc., against the resistance
of the insurance company that had issued the annuity contract.'' The trial court
first ruled that Article 9 did not invalidate the anti-assignment clause of the
settlement agreement because the payments arose out of the settlement of a tort
claim.8 2 The court then reached the rather dubious conclusion that, because under
section 322(2)(c) an anti-assignment clause is generally "for the benefit of the
obligor,"' not only should the clause be read to allow the obligor to waive it, but
the section also confers upon the obligor the right to nullify the assignment prior
to its taking place.'M
Finally, on August 15, 2000 the Connecticut Supreme Court issued its opinion
in Rumbin v. Utica Mutual Insurance Co. '85 (hereinafter "Rumbin I"), a case that
will likely become quite influential in this area. Rumbin attempted to assign his
right to the stream of proceeds under a structured settlement agreement, and Utica
Mutual Insurance Company sought to block the assignment on the basis of the
anti-assignment clauses in both its settlement and annuity contracts." The trial
court "'87 (hereinafter "Rumbin ') upheld the assignment, holding that the
Connecticut statute, which imposed purchaser disclosure and priorjudicial consent
limitations on the assignment of structured settlement proceeds, should be read to
substitute those protections for the protection previously accorded obligors by anti-
assignment clauses.'
Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Rumbin II; however, rejected the
lower court's interpretation of the applicable Connecticut statute, concluding that
it should be construed narrowly and consequently had no bearing upon the
effectiveness of anti-assignment clauses.8 9 Yet, the court ultimately affirmed the
Rumbin I ruling that rather than rendering the assignment invalid, the particular
anti-assignment clauses in that case only allowed the obligor to seek damages for
178. Id.
179. See supra notes 75 and 91 and accompanying text.
180. 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3211 (Nov. 18, 1999).
181. Id. at *l1-3.
182. Id. at *10.
183. Id. at *13 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 322(2)(c) (1981)).
184. Id. at*14.
185. 757 A.2d 526 (Conn. 2000).
186. Id. at 529.
187. 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 472 (Mar. 2, 1999), aff'd, 757 A.2d 526 (Conn. 2000).
188. Seeid. at*12.
189. Infra notes 191-202 and accompanying text.
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breach of those clauses.'9°
The Rumbin IH court's decision to allow assignment by application of
Restatement sections 317 and 322 is matched in thoroughness and sophistication
perhaps only by Owen, 9' discussed above. The court first noted that section 317
generally favors free assignability, even though 317(2)(c) allows for assignments
to be validly precluded by contract.'92 The court further noted that, given the pro-
assignment thrust of section 317 and the section 322(2) "unless a different
intention is manifested" clause, anti-assignment clauses should be narrowly
construed to limit their preclusive effects.193 Next, the court distinguished anti-
assignment clauses that merely limit or prohibit assignments from those that go
further and limit the "power to assign" or declare assignments to be "void" or
"invalid."'" The court regarded the latter phrasing of anti-assignment restrictions
as sufficient to satisfy section 322(2), thereby rendering an attempted assignment
ineffective.'95 On the other hand, the former, more general phrasing would not
satisfy section 322(2), and assignments done in the face of prohibitions so worded
would therefore be effective, albeit constituting a breach of contract entitling the
obligor to any damages that could be proven."'6
Rumbin I was likely regarded as a critical test by the "repeat players" that
regularly litigate this structured settlement assignability issue, and the Connecticut
Supreme Court was no doubt presented with very comprehensive briefings of the
issues raised. The Rumbin II opinion reflects this extensive argumentation by
citing a large number of cases raising assignment issues in various
contexts-including the Liberty Life Assurance,'97 Wonsey, 198 Grieve,'9 Johnson,2 O
and Henderson2 °' cases discussed above-as well as extensive secondary treatise
authority in support of its decision.2 2
Both the proponents and the opponents of free assignment of structured
settlement proceeds declared the Rumbin II decision to be a victory for their
190. Rumbin, 757 A.2d at 530.
191. Owen v. CNA Ins., 750 A.2d 211 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000).
192. Rumbin, 757 A.2d at 531.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 533.
196. Id. at 534.
197. Piasecki v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Boston, 728 N.E.2d 71 (111. App. Ct. 2000).
198. Wonsey v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 32 F. Supp. 2d 939 (E.D. Mich. 1998).
199. Grieve v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 58 F. Supp. 2d 319 (D. Vt. 1999).
200. Johnson v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 26 F. Supp. 2d 1227 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
201. Henderson v. Roadway Express, 720 N.E.2d 1108 (111. App. Ct. 1999).
202. Rumbin v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 757 A.2d 526 (Conn. 2000).
cause.2"3 The opponents' claim seems more plausible for two reasons. First, the
opinion unanimously rejected the argument (discussed in the following section of
this article) that the applicable statutory purchaser disclosure and prior judicial
consent provisions limited the effectiveness of anti-assignment clauses.' ° Second,
while the court upheld the assignment in the face of that particular anti-assign-
ment clause, it provided insurers with detailed instructions on how to reword those
clauses so that in the future they would be upheld to bar assignments. 5 From a
more disinterested and academic perspective, the court's careful and systematic
application of the Restatement section 317/322 framework to the question is to be
applauded. However, the decision to make the section 322(2) "unless a different
intention is manifested" determination solely on the basis of the particular
language of the anti-assignment clause alone is open to question.2 6 The two
dissenters heavily criticized this aspect of the decision, preferring to bar the
assignment on the basis of a more particularized inquiry into the intentions of the
parties.2 °7
Three broad generalizations emerge from the cases considered above. First,
while some courts appear to clearly understand the underlying intent and
analytical complexities of the Restatement sections 317 and 322 framework-as
evidenced by the Owen and Rumbin II opinions-most courts unfortunately
overlook or misunderstand key aspects of those provisions when attempting to
apply them. Second, while the Restatement framework apparently encourages
courts to find assignments effective unless (1) the parties' intentions otherwise are
clear; (2) material adverse consequences for the obligor will result; or (3) there are
statutory or public policy impediments,2 8 most of the courts seem more inclined
to apply those provisions to affirm the power of anti-assignment clauses to bar
assignments,2 " although Rumbin II could be regarded as an important exception
to this general assessment.2"0 Judges appear more eager to embrace freedom of
contract principles and less fearful of imposing undue restraints upon alienation
203. Thomas Scheffey, Selling Settlements: Getting Less, Faster, CONN. L. TRIB., Aug. 21, 2000.
Representatives of the settlement purchasing industry claim the decision will "force the insurance industry
to prove... damages," while insures predict the decision "will eventually doom the settlement-buying
business in Connecticut." Id.
204. Rumbin v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 757 A.2d 526, 530 (Conn. 2000).
205. Id. at 531-36 (explaining that it would uphold anti-assignment clauses that eliminate the recipient's
power to assign).
206. Id. at 537 (Norcott, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority's standard for determining whether
an anti-assignment clause hinders the right to assign or the power to assign "illogical and arbitrary").
207. Id. at 539-40 (Norcott, J., dissenting).
208. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFCoNTRACrs § 322 cmt. a (1981) ("But as assignment has become
a common practice, the policy which limits the validity of restraints on alienation has been applied to the
construction of contractual terms open to two or more possible constructions.").
209. It should be noted, however, that of the five cases not discussed in this section that briefly referred
to the relevant Restatement provisions, four of them ruled the assignments effective. Supra note 70.
210. Although, perhaps not because its ultimate impact is likely to be the broader use of the anti-
assignment language it declares effective to bar assignments, a point that the justices upholding the
assignment before them could not have overlooked.
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than are the Restatement drafters.
Finally, despite some commentators' expressed outrage with the practice of
the assignment of settlement payments at steep discounts and their calls for greater
legal intervention to protect structured settlement recipients from exploitation, I
very few judges choose to utilize the public policy provision of section 317(2)(b)
to aggressively and paternalistically police these assignments for unconscion ability
or usury.
C. The Impact of Disclosure and Consent Statutes.
One final issue to consider is the impact of the statutes recently adopted in a
number of jurisdictions imposing purchaser disclosure and judicial consent
limitations on the assignment of structured settlement payment rights.2" It is
unclear what effect, if any, these statutes should have upon the effectiveness of
anti-assignment clauses to bar assignments. Under one reasonable textual
interpretation, these statutes purport only to impose additional restrictions on
assignments that are otherwise effective, and thus should have no bearing upon
whether an anti-assignment clause precludes effective assignment. However,
given that virtually all structured settlement agreements include anti-assignment
clauses," 3 one might suspect that these statutes were intended to have some
bearing upon the effectiveness of assignments attempted in the face of such
clauses, and not intended only to apply to the very few (if any) assignments not
limited by contract.24 It is therefore necessary to review the legislative histories
of these statutes for evidence of the drafters' intentions.
* The only jurisdiction having such a statute where this issue has been litigated
is Connecticut. On June 8, 1998, Connecticut adopted Public Act 98-238,2"5 which
imposes substantial disclosure obligations on purchasers of structured settlement
payments and also requires the assignor of such payments to seek a prior
declaratory judgment that the assignment is in his best interest and is fair and
reasonable to all concerned." 6 In Rumbin II, the Connecticut Supreme Court
unanimously ruled that this statute had no effect on the enforceability of anti-
211. E.g., Corboy, supra note 4, at 116 (describing the transactions as "usurious" and calling for
consumer protection legislation); Shoop, supra note 4, at 12-14 (quoting one opponent calling the
transactions "loan-sharking" and describing efforts to pass legislation requiring judicial review of proposed
sales of settlement payments).
212. See supra note 10.
213. 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 472, at *12-13 (Conn. Mar. 2, 1999).
214. Id. at'9,'12.
215. Conn. Pub. Act 98-238, 1998 Conn. Legis. Serv. 5 (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-225f
(2000)).
216. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-225f (West Supp. 2000).
assignment clauses." 7
The Rumbin 11 decision on this issue is best understood against the back-
ground of the extensive lower court litigation concerning the implications of this
statute for assignability. In Rumbin I,2 a Connecticut court first considered the
effect of Public Act 98-238 upon the effectiveness of assignments made in the face
of an anti-assignment clause.219 The trial court determined that the legislature had
intended the statutory provisions to apply not only in those rare situations where
the structured settlement agreement permits assignment, but also to allow
assignments satisfying the statutory criteria even where the settlement agreement
includes an anti-assignment clause.22 ° That court, therefore, read the statute as
effectively substituting a disinterested court review for the protection otherwise
accorded the obligor by an anti-assignment clause.22' The Rumbin I court declared
the assignment effective, noting that the insurer had not offered any evidence of
adverse tax effects or other detriment by virtue of the assignment.
22
Bobbitt v. SAFECO Assigned Benefits Company23 revisited this question.
After a full analysis of Public Act 98-238 and the Rumbin I precedent, the Bobbitt
court concluded that the statute applied only to assignments that were otherwise
permitted, and had no bearing upon the enforceability of anti-assignment
clauses.224 After expressly declining to follow Rumbin l's interpretation of the
statute, the court ruled that the anti-assignment clause in the dispute before it
barred the attempted assignment. 2 '
In Buchanan v. American Mutual Life Insurance Company,226 the court again
considered the impact of Public Act 98-238.227 After citing and briefly reviewing
both the Rumbin I and Bobbitt precedents, the Buchanan Court embraced the
Rumbin I interpretation and declared the assignment effective.2' Cavallaro v.
SAFECO Assigned Benefits Co.22 9 similarly embraced the Rumbin I position and
rejected the Bobbitt interpretation.2  Finally, in the last pre-Rumbin 11 trial court
case addressing the question, the court in McKay v. Aetna Casualty and Surety
217. Rumbin v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 757 A.2d 526 (Conn. 2000). See supra notes 176-77 and
accompanying text.
218. 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 472 (Mar. 2, 1999).
219. Id.
220. Id. at *9.
221. Id.
222. Id. at *13-14.
223. 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2347 (Aug. 24, 1999).
224. Id. at *23. ("The most reasonable interpretation of the language of P.A. 98-238 is that it imposes
the requirement of court approval only upon proposed assignments of structured settlements which are
otherwise allowed.").
225. Id. at *24-25.
226. 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3094 (Nov. 15, 1999).
227. Id.
228. Id. at *5-8.
229. 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3211 (Nov. 18, 1999).
230. Id. at *18-19, n.8.
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Co.,231 followed Bobbitt and invalidated the assignment before it, thereby rejecting
the Rumbin I interpretation. 2
This issue was finally addressed by the Connecticut Supreme Court in Rumbin
H.233 The court unanimously, and rather summarily, rejected the Rumbin I
rationale and embraced the Bobbitt position.2" The court strongly endorsed the
principle that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly and
narrowly construed.235 The court then determined that, because the statute at issue
did not expressly address the effectiveness of anti-assignment clauses, there was
no clear indication of legislative intent to alter the common law of assignability
that would justify giving it that effect.236 The issue now appears settled in
Connecticut, but the effect of comparable statutes in other jurisdictions remains
unclear. Given the variations in construction, legislative intent, and lack of
precedent in many of those jurisdictions, the impact of statutes calling for
purchaser disclosure and prior judicial consent upon the effectiveness of anti-
assignment clauses to bar assignment of structured settlement payments cannot be
predicted with any certainty.
II. CONCLUSION
This article has reviewed in some detail the numerous recent cases addressing
the effectiveness of anti-assignment clauses in structured settlement agreements,
and the issues these cases present. It has also noted with approval the widespread
application of sections 317 and 322 of the Restatement to the central question
presented, and described the inadequacies of many courts' utilization of those
provisions. In closing, this author would like to offer some thoughts concerning
the proper application of this Restatement approach to these questions.
Courts should start their analyses with Restatement section 322(2), and first
determine whether the anti-assignment provision at issue demonstrates the parties'
intent to preclude assignment, rather than the intent to merely confer a right to
seek damages upon the obligor.2 37 They should not, however, follow the Rumbin
11 approach and make this determination solely on the basis of fine verbal
distinctions concerning the language of the anti-assignment clause. These clauses
generally appear to be standard "boilerplate" provisions drawn from a form book
231. 2000 Conn. Super. LEXIS 840 (Mar. 29, 2000).
232. Id. at *9.
233. Rumbin v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 757 A.2d 526 (Conn. 2000).
234. Id. at 530.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
and not individually tailored to the parties, particular circumstances, or concerns
to any meaningful extent. Instead, courts should consider the entire conduct of the
settlement negotiations and the extent to which the obligor has evidenced a
concern with adverse tax or other implications of an assignment. If, after this
broader inquiry, they find that an intent to preclude assignment was present, they
should hold the preclusion valid under section 317(2)(c) and find the attempted
assignment ineffective.
If there is no determination of a valid preclusion of assignments by the anti-
assignment clause, the section 317(a) and (b) criteria for the validity of the
assignment should be examined. Starting with section 317(2)(a), the court should
consider whether the obligor will experience material adverse effects. The only
potentially material impact that might exist beyond the minimal administrative
processing requirements of an assignment is the risk inherent in the Internal
Revenue Code section 130 tax question." 8 This is a difficult issue because the
significance of the risk of loss of tax benefits is unclear. 39 However, this
materiality inquiry should be rendered moot if any evidence was presented in the
earlier section 322(2) inquiry that the anticipation of this tax risk was a factor in
the inclusion of the anti-assignment provision. Where an inquiry into the
materiality of this risk is called for, because this risk has never materialized in a
loss of tax benefits for an insurer, it should probably be determined that the tax
and other consequences of an assignment of payment rights are non-material and
do not bar its effectiveness.
After the court has determined that the consequences of an assignment are not
material, the final step should be a search under section 317(2)(b) for any
applicable statutory or public policy restrictions on assignment. Because Article
9 does not apply to these assignments,2' the only potentially applicable statutory
restrictions on assignability are the recent statutes imposing purchaser disclosure
and prior judicial consent limitations.24 As previously noted, however, while the
question has been resolved under Connecticut law, it is still somewhat unclear
what impact those statutes enacted in other jurisdictions will have upon the
effectiveness of anti-assignment clauses. 2 The clauses may be construed Rumbin
//-style, as merely imposing additional limitations on otherwise-permitted
assignments, or they may be regarded Rumbin I-style, as permissive provisions
238. See supra notes 113-120 and accompanying text,
239. Compare Grieve v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 58 F. Supp. 2d 319, 323 (D. Vt. 1999) (finding that
an assignment would create a material risk of loss of section 130 tax benefits), and Henderson v. Roadway
Express, 720 N.E.2d 1108 (I11. App. Ct. 1999) (in accord with Grieve), with W. United Life Assurance Co.
v. Hayden, 64 F.3d 833, 842 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding that the section 130 tax benefits probably vest once
the payment obligation is undertaken), and In Re Cooper, 242 BR. 767 (S.D. Ga. 1999) (in accord with
W United Life Assurance Co.). See also Andrada, supra note 3, at 481-90 (characterizing the risk of
adverse IRS action as "extremely small").
240. See supra notes 26-42 and accompanying text.
241. See supra note 10.
242. See supra notes 161-77 and accompanying text.
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that will supersede otherwise valid contractual preclusions of assignability to allow
assignments.
Finally, the public policy provision of Restatement section 317(2)(b) provides
an opportunity for courts to ensure that unfair advantage is not taken of impecu-
nious payment recipients. Respect for freedom of contract does not require courts
to ignore situations where substantial long-term payment streams are being
assigned at discount rates of twenty percent to thirty percent or higher.243 It is
entirely appropriate for judges to exercise a little paternalistic oversight to prevent
this type of exploitation, particularly given the adoption of statutes in a number of
jurisdictions requiring prior judicial approval of such assignments as being fair
and reasonable to all involved.
As noted earlier in this article, Representative Shaw and Senator Chaffee have
in recent years made unsuccessful legislative proposals calling for the imposition
of very large excise taxes on factoring companies in connection with most
structured settlement assignments.2' If such legislation is ever adopted at the
federal level, it would drastically curtail this practice, if not eliminate it
altogether24 -which seems its clear intention-and thus render moot the question
of the enforceability of anti-assignment provisions in settlement agreements.
However, in the absence of such preclusive federal legislation, the issues addressed
in this Article will likely continue to be actively litigated.
243. Corboy, supra note 4, at 116.
244. Supra note 10. Neither the text of the legislative proposals nor the limited legislative history
available indicates the primary motive for these efforts. They may have been fueled by the paternalistic
concern for the long-term welfare of settlement recipients, or instead by insurance industry lobbying efforts
seeking to bolster the viability of the industry's settlement annuity business. The latter factor could have
played a covert but significant role in overcoming legislative inertia at both the state and federal levels.
245. Id.
